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How	populist	radical	right	parties	have	eroded	the
EU’s	human	rights	agenda	in	the	Mediterranean
It	is	often	assumed	that	populist	radical	right	parties	will	support	disengaging	from	the	European	Union	by
default.	Adrià	Rivera	Escartin	writes	that	although	many	of	these	parties	do	support	disengaging	from	the	EU,
there	is	the	potential	for	a	different	approach	to	be	adopted	in	future	which	might	be	termed	‘informal	and	illiberal
Europeanisation’.	Italy’s	capacity	to	shape	EU	relations	with	Tunisia	and	Hungary’s	efforts	to	influence	the	EU’s
relations	with	Egypt	offer	two	recent	examples	of	how	this	trend	might	materialise.
Matteo	Salvini	speaking	at	the	European	Parliament,	Credit:	©	European	Union	2015	–	European	Parliament	(CC	BY-NC-ND	4.0)
The	days	before	the	2019	European	elections,	Steve	Bannon,	the	guru	of	the	populist	radical	right,	pledged	that	an
alliance	of	Eurosceptic	parties	orbiting	around	the	figures	of	the	former	Italian	Interior	Minister	Matteo	Salvini	and
the	Hungarian	Prime	Minister	Viktor	Orbán	would	be	able	to	secure	a	substantial	share	of	seats	in	the	European
Parliament.	Their	proclaimed	objective	was	to	block	EU	politics	from	within	and	to	combat	the	spectre	of	a	federal
EU.	Although	they	fell	short	of	expectations	in	the	European	elections,	they	have	performed	well	at	the	national
level	across	the	continent.	Consequently,	populist	radical	right	parties	have	been	able	to	secure	important	executive
positions	in	countries	such	as	Poland,	Hungary,	Italy	and	Austria.
As	far	as	the	member	states	are	key	in	the	making	of	EU	foreign	policy,	one	might	wonder	how	the	formation	of
governments	that	include	these	parties	could	affect	the	activity	of	the	EU	outside	its	borders.	This	question	appears
even	more	pressing	in	the	case	of	the	Mediterranean,	firstly,	because	of	the	high	importance	that	populist	radical
right	parties	give	to	the	region	for	its	role	in	migration	governance	and	security	matters,	and	secondly,	because	the
EU	has	a	strong	presence	in	Northern	Africa,	through	instruments	like	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy,	in
terms	of	trade	and	diplomatic	cooperation.
One	possible	outcome	of	the	increasing	power	of	populist	radical	right	parties	is	the	replication	of	the	Brexit	model
in	their	home	countries	or,	otherwise,	the	adoption	of	a	de-Europeanisation	strategy,	namely	remaining	in	the	EU
while	advocating	for	strategic	partial	exits	in	specific	policy	fields	like	foreign	policy.	In	this	case,	the	member	states
might	try	to	undo	cooperation	mechanisms	and	return	to	an	intergovernmentalist	logic	in	those	dimensions	where
the	Commission	has	strong	powers,	like	trade	or	cooperation	aid.
Yet,	there	is	a	third	possible	outcome	that	could	be	labelled	informal	and	illiberal	Europeanisation.	It	might	be	that
populist	radical	right	parties	in	power	try	to	influence	EU	foreign	policy	so	that	it	reflects	their	own	values	and
expectations.	The	adoption	of	such	a	strategy	is	more	likely	when	the	costs	of	leaving	the	Union	are	too	high,	and
when	member	states	profit	from	the	EU’s	political	and	economic	umbrella	to	pursue	their	national	agendas.
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Informal	and	illiberal	Europeanisation	entails	a	different	understanding	of	Europeanisation,	which	in	the	past	was
associated	with	the	expansion	of	liberal	values	and	with	two	vertical	power	dynamics:	uploading	–	through	which
the	member	states	project	their	national	preferences	towards	the	EU	level	–	and	downloading	–	the	process
whereby	a	member	state	adapts	its	national	foreign	policy	to	the	EU	foreign	policy	objectives	and/or	its	institutional
framework.
Instead,	the	informal	dimension	of	Europeanisation	is	characterised	by	an	increasing	importance	of	horizontal
contacts	between	states	in	the	making	of	EU	foreign	policy.	Some	member	states,	including	those	with	populist
radical	right	parties	in	government,	create	informal	groups	of	like-minded	countries	to	convince	other	member
states	to	adopt	their	policy	preferences	and	eventually	influence	politics	at	the	EU	level.	The	Visegrád	Group	is	one
example.
In	the	case	of	populist	radical	right	parties,	they	do	so	through	directional	leadership	(leading	by	making	the	first
move)	and	using	an	emotional	anti-migration	discourse	that	tries	to	legitimise	radical	and	unilateral	action.	The
illiberal	dimension	of	Europeanisation	comes	when	governments	with	populist	radical	right	parties	advocate	for	the
adoption	of	their	own	illiberal	norms	and	values,	which	entail	restrictive	migration	policies	and	a	watering	down	of
human	rights	agendas.
Two	examples	can	be	put	forward	in	order	to	illustrate	the	dynamics	of	informal	and	illiberal	Europeanisation.	Under
the	leadership	of	Matteo	Salvini’s	Lega,	Italy	created	an	informal	coalition	of	member	states	in	favour	of	setting	up
‘disembarkation	platforms’	for	irregular	migrants	in	Tunisia	during	the	summer	of	2018.	These	plans	were	adopted
by	the	Council	but	were	never	implemented	given	Tunis’	rejection.
For	its	part,	Hungary	sought	to	normalise	relations	with	Egypt	after	the	2013	coup	and	make	other	member	states
follow	suit.	For	example,	Orbán	was	the	first	EU	leader	to	visit	the	country	after	the	assassination	of	young
researcher	Giulio	Regeni	and	repeatedly	proclaimed	that	the	EU	should	avoid	‘lecturing’	Egypt	about	human	rights
issues.
As	a	result,	in	the	case	of	Tunisia,	Italy’s	first	Conte	Cabinet	reinforced	conditionality	in	migration,	further	frustrating
the	expectations	of	the	Tunisian	authorities	and	civil	society	about	the	EU	and	its	support	for	democratic	transition.
In	Egypt,	the	EU	became	increasingly	disengaged	from	a	human	rights	agenda,	a	move	that	Orbán	had	been
defending	in	the	framework	of	the	Visegrád	Group.
Populist	radical	right	parties	might	not	pose	a	challenge	to	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	EU.	However,	their	arrival	to
power	might	change	or	at	least	influence	the	nature	of	the	policies	that	the	EU	tries	to	put	forward.	Informal	and
illiberal	Europeanisation	can	deepen	existing	inconsistencies	in	EU	foreign	policy	in	the	Mediterranean.
These	inconsistencies	imply	contradictions	between	a	proclaimed	objective	of	EU	foreign	policy	in	the
Mediterranean,	such	as	promoting	human	rights	and	assisting	democracy,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	other	priorities
like	defending	self-centred	economic	interests	or	short-term	stability.	As	many	researchers	have	signalled,
inconsistencies	are	not	new,	but	the	coming	into	power	of	populist	radical	right	parties	exacerbates	these	dynamics
and	further	erodes	the	EU’s	human	rights	agenda	in	the	Mediterranean.
The	two	examples	presented	above	are	circumscribed	to	EU	foreign	policy	in	the	Mediterranean.	The	plausibility	of
these	observations	should	be	thus	tested	in	other	scenarios	of	EU	foreign	policy	as	well	as	in	other	policy	fields.	Of
course,	it	is	also	possible	that	informal	and	illiberal	Europeanisation	is	not	a	real	possibility	in	other	contexts.	Also,
one	has	to	take	into	account	that	these	dynamics	can	be	reverted	after	populist	radical	right	parties	lose	power.
This	was	the	case	in	Italy,	when	Lega	left	the	first	Conte	Cabinet	in	August	2019	and	a	new	government	was
formed	with	a	different	approach	to	EU	politics.	One	important	thing	to	retain	is	that,	besides	the	debate	around
leaving	and	remaining	in	the	EU,	it	is	vital	to	research	and	reflect	on	how	populist	radical	right	parties	can	shape	EU
policy	and,	as	a	consequence,	impact	citizens’	everyday	lives	inside	and	outside	its	borders.
For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	paper	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	Democratic	Audit.	It	was	first	published	on	LSE’s
EUROPP	blog.
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